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In early 2000, President Abdurrahman Wahid declared that he wanted to rectify 
what he saw as the harsh and unjust treatment of communists in Indonesia. He 
apologized for the mass slaughter of communists in the months following the failed 
coup attempt of 30 September 1965, and he called for an investigation into those 
killings. He acknowledged that the organization he had once led, Nahdlatul Ulama 
(NU, The Revival of the Islamic Scholars), had been heavily involved in the killings, 
but he said that this would not deter him from seeking the truth. He also proposed that 
the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly Decision no. 25 of 1966 (TAP MPRS 
25/1966) that banned the Communist Party of Indonesia (Partai Komunis Indonesia, 
PKI) be rescinded.2 His proposals sparked an immediate outcry from a range of 
Muslim and anti-communist groups, but the sharpest criticism came from within NU. 
Senior NU figures denounced Abdurrahman's plans as dangerous, in that they would 
pave the way for a communist revival and also rekindle memories of past conflict that 
could result in new tensions within society.3 Some NU leaders expressed pride in their 
organization's role in the killings and the elimination of the PKI, while others 
downplayed NU's involvement, claiming that the army had committed most of the
1 Katharine McGregor's research was supported under the Australian Research Council's Discovery 
Project (Project no DP0772760). The authors thank Indonesia's anonymous reviewer for the helpful 
feedback.
2 "Terhadap Korban G30S/PKI Gus Dur: Sejak Dulu Sudah Minta Maaf," Kompas, March 15, 2000.
3 See Yusuf Hasyim, "Kenapa kita menentang komunisme?," Republika, April 29, 2000.
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executions. Perhaps taken aback at the reaction, the president made no further 
statements on the matter and TAP MPRS 25/1966 was allowed to remain in effect. 
While discussion of Abdurrahman's proposal raged for several weeks, ultimately the 
topic was supplanted in the media by new controversies swirling around the 
Abdurrahman government.
This brief flare-up at the turn of the century of the debate about NU's role in the 
1965-66 killings was the only time since the mid-1960s that the "killings" issue 
commanded widespread attention in the mainstream media and public discourse. That 
the issue should so quickly have subsided says much about its sensitive nature (i.e., 
people are unwilling to discuss it), particularly within NU circles. NU leaders and 
writers are circumspect about how they refer to these events. On the one hand, they 
regularly mention the achievements of NU's youth wing, Ansor, in "safeguarding" the 
Muslim community from the communist threat. NU books and exhibitions often 
include photos of Ansor members undergoing paramilitary training or staging anti­
communist parades with marching bands and large banners (albeit these publications 
seldom mention any details of the killings and the precise role that NU units played).4 
On the other hand, several NU-based non-government organizations have quietly 
conducted reconciliation programs over the past decade between small numbers of NU 
members and former communists, with varying degrees of success. Such initiatives 
have incurred the wrath of senior NU officials, who warn the NGOs that the topic is 
best left alone. Indeed, the only eminent NU leader who has been willing, over many 
years, to criticize openly NU's role in the bloodshed is Abdurrahman Wahid, though 
his detractors point out that he had the luxury of being overseas when the violence 
took place.
The NU is frequently identified in the literature on the 1965 killings as playing a 
key role,5 but opinions are divided regarding the extent to which they were pushed by 
the military into participating in the violence.6 In recent years, members of the NU 
have claimed that they were incited and directed by the military. In this paper, we 
explore two main issues. The first is historical: what was the role of NU during the 
killings? This raises a number of subsidiary questions. How much knowledge of and 
control over the killings did the NU central leadership have? Did the army push NU 
into slaughtering communists, or was NU a willing and active participant? What roles 
did the ulama (Muslim scholars) play in this process? Through a close analysis of NU 
documents, interviews, and NU branch communiques, this essay probes and measures
4 See, for example, the displays in the Nahdlatul Ulama Museum in Surabaya, which include photos of NU 
mass meetings following the 30 September coup and of Banser (paramilitary corps) men gathered together 
in small groups ready for action. See also Soeleiman Fadeli and Mohammad Subhan, Antologi NU: Sejarah, 
Istilah, Amaliah dan Uswah (Surabaya: Khalista and LTN NU, 2007).
5 Robert Cribb, The Indonesian Killings 1965-66: Studies from Java and Bali (Clayton: Centre of Southeast 
Asian Studies, Monash University, 1990), p. 26.
6 Sulistyo argues, for example, that in Kediri there was close cooperation between the military and NU, 
whereas in Jombang the military's role was less clear and the role of NU was more prominent. Sudjatmiko 
argues that in Central Java, due to the shortage of army units, the military armed and trained members of 
Banser and other vigilante groups who then carried out the killings. He believes that in Kediri and Jember, 
NU played a dominant role in anti-PKI actions. See Hermawan Sulistyo, "The Forgotten Years: The 
Missing History of Indonesia's Mass Slaughters, Jombang-Kediri 1965-1966" (PhD dissertation, Arizona 
State University, 1997); and Iwan Gardono Sudjatmiko, "The Destruction of the Indonesian Communist 
Party (PKI): A Comparative Analysis of East Java and Bali" (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 1992).
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the extent of institutional support within the Nadhlatul Ulama leadership for the anti­
communist killings. Second, we examine the more recent legacy of the killings for the 
NU community. In particular, we consider the range of discourses within NU and look 
at the role of NGOs and activists linked to NU who are involved in reconciliation and 
rehabilitation efforts. This section of the paper draws on interviews and newspaper 
commentary from members of NU during the period 1998-2009, after the demise of the 
Suharto regime, during which there has been heightened attention to human-rights 
abuses and an initiative to open and explore this past.7
NU-Communist Party Relations
Martin van Bruinessen has written that "the deepest cultural and political divide in 
Indonesian society, and the one invested with the most emotion and mistrust, is that 
between Islam and Communism."8 NU, like most other Islamic organizations, has a 
long history of antipathy towards communists. Since its founding in 1926, NU leaders 
have consistently spoken out against communism, denouncing its doctrine as atheistic 
and its ideals of collective ownership of wealth and property as anathema to Islamic 
teachings.9 But NU's anti-communism, until the late 1940s, was less intense than that of 
their modernist co-religionists in organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Persis. 
Modernists tended to be worldlier and better informed than NU traditionalists about 
the nature of communist regimes in Europe and Asia, and modernist journals gave 
much space to discussing and repudiating Marxism and other communist doctrines.10 
By contrast, NU's preoccupation was more concerned with intra-Islamic community 
dynamics, particularly relations with its modernist rivals, than with any ideological 
condemnation of communism.
This posture changed dramatically during the revolutionary period (1945-49), 
when NU ulama came to view communists as not only a political, but also a direct 
physical, threat to traditionalist Muslims. Tensions between leftist parties and 
Masyumi, the main Islamic party of which NU was a major component, as well as 
growing mutual suspicion between communist and devout Muslim soldiers and 
militia members, created a volatile situation. This climaxed in September 1948 with the 
Madiun Affair, in which PKI-affiliated forces attempted to take over the local 
government. During the uprising, PKI fighters killed tens, and possibly hundreds, of
7 These interviews (2007-09) were conducted by Kate McGregor and Vannessa Hearman as part of a larger 
research project on Islam and the politics of memory in post-authoritarian Indonesia, funded by the 
Australian Research Council's Discovery Project scheme. All of the interviews cited in this article from the 
early 1990s were conducted by Greg Fealy unless otherwise noted.
8 Martin van Bruinessen, "Post-Soeharto Muslim Engagements with Civil Society and Democratization," 
in Indonesia in Transition: Rethinking "Civil Society," "Region," and "Crisis," ed. Samuel Hanneman and 
Henk Schulte Nordholt (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2004), p. 55.
9 Not all ulama were antipathetic to communism. In the early 1920s, Haji Misbach, a leading modernist 
preacher in Solo, rose to prominence in leftist circles with his teachings about the compatibility of Islam 
and communism. Though few other ulama had shared Misbach's close identification with communism, 
numerous other ulama were sympathetic to some aspects of socialism. See Takashi Shiraishi, An Age in 
Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java, 1912-1926 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990), pp. 127-38.
10 Traditionalist Muslims are those who follow one of the four medieval law schools and who tend to be 
culturally inclusive. Modernists are those who base their practice of Islam on the Qur'an and Prophetic 
example, rather than on the law schools. Most traditionalists in Indonesia identify with NU. The main 
modernist organizations are Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam.
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Masyumi leaders and supporters, including NU members, before the Republican Army 
crushed the rebellion. From this time on, NU regarded the PKI as an inherent enemy. 
There were also ongoing efforts to keep the memories of these Madiun reprisals alive. 
In 1950, for example, a Masyumi-linked organization called repeatedly for September 
18, the day of the Madiun revolt, to be declared a National Day of Mourning for the 
"Islamic martyrs" who died on that day.11 NU and military-sponsored texts regularly 
referred to the "slaughter" or "massacre" of "hundreds" of NU members by 
communists at Madiun, though this characterization of the event is very likely 
exaggerated, and made no mention of Masyumi aggression against PKI fighters, which 
appears also to have been significant.12
During the 1950s, NU maintained a consistently oppositional attitude toward the 
PKI. It resisted President Sukarno's attempts in 1953 and 1956 to elevate PKI cadre and 
communist sympathizers to cabinet posts, and also campaigned against leftist 
appointments to senior military and bureaucratic positions. The changing political 
dynamics and growing electoral power of the PKI from the mid-1950s created a 
dilemma for NU.13 While the PKI was rising in strength, support for NU and other 
parties was falling. As Sukarno, with the backing of the army and the PKI, began 
dismantling parliamentary democracy and erecting a semi-authoritarian system, NU's 
leadership was divided on whether to join the new Guided Democracy regime or 
oppose it. A major objection of those who opposed Guided Democracy was the 
presence of PKI members in the government. Eventually, NU adopted a policy of 
accommodation and participated in all the cabinets and institutions of Guided 
Democracy. One of the rationales for participation was that it would allow NU to 
counteract directly PKI influence within the government and the bureaucracy. Those 
favoring accommodation argued that if NU were not part of Guided Democracy, then 
it would be in a weak position to defend its constituency.14
Relations between NU and the PKI continued to deteriorate throughout the early 
1960s, despite both parties being required to maintain an outward appearance of 
cooperation within the regime. The growing presence and assertiveness of the PKI in 
NU strongholds in East and Central Java aroused particular concern. When the PKI 
launched its unilateral action (aksi sepihak) campaign in late 1963 to seize "excess" farm 
land, frequently targeting large landholdings controlled by ulama or their supporters,
11 "Pemberontakan Kaum Madiun," Pedoman, September 7,1954, p. 1; "Buku Putih PKI," Pedoman, 
September 18, 1953, p. 1; "Kedjadian Madiun: Sedjarah Pemberontakan PKI," KengPo, September 18,1954, 
p. 2; "Masyumi Surabaya," Pedoman, September 24,1953, p. 1. For more on the debates about Madiun 
between the PKI and Masyumi in the 1950s, see Katharine McGregor, "A Reassessment of the Significance 
of the 1948 Madiun Uprising to the Cold War in Indonesia," Kaftan Malaysia, vol. xxvi,l (2009).
12 Ann Swift, The Road to Madiun: The Indonesian Communist Uprising o f 1948 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern 
Indonesia Project, 1989), footnotes 130 and 138 on pp. 76 and 78; and Tim Penyusun Jawa Pos, Lubang- 
Lubang Pembantaian Petualangan PKI di Madiun (Jakarta: Grafiti, 1990). George Kahin estimated the number 
of dead Masyumi members at several hundred, but he admits in the second edition of his book that he 
relied strongly on Masyumi sources, so there is still reason for some scepticism concerning this figure. 
George Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press, 
1970), p. 300.
13 PKI gained 16 percent of the votes in the 1955 elections to become the fourth largest party, and averaged 
27 percent in the local elections of 1957-58, indicating that it was now the most popular party.
14 Greg Fealy, "Wahab Chasbullah, Traditionalism and the Political Development of Nahdlatul Ulama," in 
Nahdlatul Ulama, Traditional Islam and Modernity in Indonesia, ed. Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (Clayton: 
Monash Asia Institute, Monash University, 1996), pp. 1-41.
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clashes between PKI and NU supporters quickly broke out. In most cases, NU groups 
succeeded in driving off communist groups from NU land, but the depth of animus 
had, by early 1965, reached dangerous levels.
The Rise of the NU Militants
The growing power of the PKI during the early 1960s deepened the cleavages 
within NU's leadership and led to the emergence of two broad groups: the 
accommodationists, who pursued a pragmatic policy towards Guided Democracy and 
the PKI; and the militants, who were fervently anti-communist. Prominent 
accommodationists included the party's rais am (president), Wahab Chasbullah; its 
chairman, Idham Chalid; and central board members, such as Saifuddin Zuhri and 
Masykur. Many of the militants were either former army officers or had developed 
close links to anti-PKI military officers. Chief among them were Yusuf Hasyim, a tough 
ex-infantry officer and chairman of NU's young men's wing, Ansor; Bisri Syamsuri, the 
deputy rais am; Hamid Baidowi, a retired military intelligence officer and businessman; 
Munasir Ali, a former army major and secretary-general of the national Veterans' 
League (Legiun Veteran); and younger NU leaders, such as Chalid Mawardi, a 
journalist and Ansor secretary-general; as well as the dashing entrepreneur and NU 
deputy chairman, Subchan Z. E. From the early 1960s, all had worked with anti­
communist officers, politicians, and community groups in organizing against the PKI.
The militants were intent on preparing NU for confrontation with the communists 
and sought to mobilize its mass organizations such as Ansor, Sarbumusi (Muslim 
Indonesian Workers Union), Lesbumi (Muslim Indonesian Cultural Institute), 
Muslimat NU (NU women's branch), Pertanu (NU Peasants' Association), and PMII 
(NUs tertiary student body) to counter corresponding PKI affiliates such as Pemuda 
Rakyat (the People's Youth), SOBSI (Indonesian Central Labor Organization), LEKRA 
(The People's Cultural Institute), Gerwani (Indonesian Women's Movement), CGMNI 
(The General Committee of Tertiary Students) and the BTI (Indonesian Peasant's 
Front).15 The NU systematically built up anti-PKI networks at the local level, 
particularly in East and Central Java, drawing heavily on cadre from Ansor and 
Ikapebi (Ikatan Bekas Pejuang Islam, or Association of Muslim Ex-Fighters), an NU's 
veterans' organization.
The militants also ensured that anti-communist NU cadre participated in the new 
organizations formed under the aegis of Guided Democracy. Chief among them were 
the Badan Kerja Sama (BKS; Cooperation Bodies), organizations designed to improve 
relations between the army and various non-communist political and functional
15 Several of the organizations listed above are acronyms. Sarbumusi: Sarekat Buruh Muslimin Indonesia, 
or Union of Indonesian Muslim Workers. Lesbumi: Lembaga Seniman-Budayawan Muslimin Indonesia, 
or Institute of Indonesian Muslim Artists and Cultural Practitioners. Pertanu: Pertanian Nahdlatul Ulama, 
or Nahdlatul Ulama Farming Association. PMII: Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, or Indonesian 
Muslim Students Movement. SOBSI: Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, or All Indonesian 
Workers' Organization Center. LEKRA is Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat, or People's Cultural Institute. 
Gerwani is Gerakan Wanita Indonesia, or Indonesian Women's Movement. CGMNI: Comite General 
Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia, or Indonesian Tertiary Students' General Committee. BTI: Barisan Tani 
Indonesia, or Indonesian Peasants' Front. On NU forming these organizations, see Slamet Effendy Yusuf, 
Mohamad Ichwan Syam, and Masdar Farid Mas'udi, Dinamika Kaum Santri: Menelusuri Jejak and Pergolakan 
Internal NU (Jakarta: C. V. Rajawali, 1983), p. 48.
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groups.16 From I960, Sukarno incorporated the Cooperation Bodies into the National 
Front and required greater PKI participation. Involvement in these groups offered 
participants training, facilities, contact with non-communist officers, and the 
opportunity to "shadow" PKI activities.
The most important initiative of the militants in confronting the PKI was the 
formation of Banser (Barisan Ansor Serba Guna, Ansor Multi-Purpose Brigade), a 
paramilitary corps within Ansor. Founded in 1962, its official purpose was to provide 
physical protection for party activities and supporters, but its unstated aim was to 
protect the NU community from attack by the PKI. Yusuf Hasyim, who featured 
prominently in Banser's early development, claimed the inspiration for Banser came 
from studying Ffitler's Mein Kampf, in which Hitler detailed the need to develop a 
power base through the Nazi party to counter a threat.17 Initially, Banser membership 
was restricted to long-time Ansor members or trusted santri (devout Muslims) from 
pesantren in NU strongholds. Members received physical training, which included 
traditional martial arts, such as pencak silat.18 Banser members frequently recount the 
arduous, often punishing nature of this training, with trainees regularly suffering 
severe bruising, flesh wounds, and even broken bones. Ansor members with military 
experience dating back to the independence struggle were the favored appointees as 
either the heads or advisors of local Banser units.19 Banser soon became a formidable 
force within NU, with well-trained and highly disciplined members who were 
militantly anti-communist. Aksi sepihak provided the first test of Banser's paramilitary 
capacity and, in many areas, Banser units formed the front line in defending land 
owned by NU members and supporters. In most clashes, Banser members were 
usually able to resist communist groups and often succeeded in putting them to flight. 
Banser soon gained a reputation for unflinching physical opposition to communism, a 
point noted by anti-PKI army officers, and NU militants became confident about their 
ability to confront and defeat the PKI.20
The 30 September Movement
Throughout August and September, NU, like other parties and Islamic 
organizations, was awash with rumors and speculation about a possible coup, and 
many had prepared contingency plans. As soon as news of the coup attempt spread, 
NU leaders and activists gathered at two sites: the house of the late Wahid Hasyim, the 
son of NU's founder and former minister, in Matraman, and Subchan's luxury house in
16 Herbert Feith, Dynamics o f Guided Democracy, in Indonesia, ed. Ruth McVey (New Haven, CT: Southeast 
Asia Studies, Yale University, by arrangement with HRAF Press, 1963), p. 335.
17 The name "Banser" was inspired by the name for the Hitler Youth, Panzer Divisions. See Yusuf Hasyim, 
"Killing Communists," in Indonesia in the Suharto Years: Issues, Incidents, and Images, 2nd edition, ed. John 
McGlynn et al. (Jakarta: Lontar and KITLV Press, 2007).
18 Hairus Salim, Kelompok Paramiliter NU (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2004), p. 7.
19 Andree Feillard, NU vis a via Negara: pencarian Isi, Bentuk dan Makna (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1999), pp. 65-66.
20 Margo Lyons, Bases o f Conflict in Rural Java (Berkeley, CA: Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, 
University of California, 1970); and Greg Fealy, Ijtihad Politik Ulama: Sejarah NU 1952-1967 (Yogyakarta: 
LkiS, 2003), pp. 318-25.
NU and the Killings of 1965-66 43
Jalan Banyumas, Menteng, both in Central Jakarta.21 The Matraman group was the 
more important of the two as it contained numerous members of NU's leadership, 
particularly from the militant faction, and it became the nerve center of NU's responses 
during early October. For many years, the Hasyim house had been one of the gathering 
places in Jakarta for NU's elite, especially those hailing from the big kiai (Islamic 
scholar) clans of the Jombang region in East Java. The Banyumas house attracted a 
young, diverse assortment of cadre, including many NU student and youth leaders, as 
well as Catholic and non-communist nationalists who were personally close to 
Subchan.
The NU militants were convinced that the coup involved the PKI. For months, 
Indonesia had been gripped by speculation and tension over President Sukarno's 
declining health and the prospect that, if he fell seriously ill or died, the rival 
communist and anti-communist forces would engage in open conflict. Rumors that the 
PKI had smuggled Chinese weapons into Indonesia and was secretly arming and 
training its own militia added to the sense of impending crisis. One of the NU militants 
at Matraman recalled: "We knew immediately that this was the work of the PKI. No 
one disagreed about this."22 They resolved on three responses to the situation: (1) to 
deploy trusted NU cadre to move inconspicuously about Jakarta and report back on 
coup events, especially the control of key sites and facilities by the plotters; (2) to 
quickly establish contact with anti-communist army officers to prepare for both 
defensive action and possible retaliation against the PKI; and (3) to open lines of 
emergency communication with NU branches to ensure that reactions against the coup 
were coordinated and did not heighten the risk to NU members.23
Reports from NU cadre soon established that only a few sections of the city were 
under the control of those involved in the coup and that there seemed to be no mass 
mobilization of the PKI or attacks on NU leaders or assets. By mid-evening of October 
1, NU leaders at Matraman and Banyumas felt certain that the coup attempt was 
crumbling. NU scouts informed their leaders that in central Freedom Square (Medan 
Merdeka), troops allied to the 30 September Movement had dispersed, and soldiers 
loyal to interim army commander and well-known anti-communist Major-General 
Suharto now controlled the strategic sites in the capital. Suharto's national radio 
broadcast at 9:00 PM was further proof that the coup was effectively over. NU leaders, 
now less fearful of communist retaliation, began discussing how the failed coup may 
have provided the long-awaited opportunity to crush the PKI. Before acting, though, 
they needed evidence of PKI involvement in the 30 September Movement, as well as 
the army's approval for moving against the communists.
The first high-level contact with military officers took place late on October 1, when 
Subchan contacted a number of Suharto allies, including Major General Umar 
Wirahadikusumah, the Jakarta commander, and Brigadier General Sutjipto, the head of 
the political section of KOTI (Komando Operasi Tertinggi, Supreme Operations 
Command). He was informed of the kidnapping of the generals and communist
21 The Wahid Hasyim house, at Jalan Taman Amir Hamzah no. 8, is now the office of the Wahid Institute. 
Until the late 1990s, it remained largely as it was in the 1950s and 1960s, a rare example of living history 
within NU.
22 Interview with Abdulhaq Idris, Jakarta, May 3,1992.
23 Interviews with Munasir, Jakarta, September 14,1991, and Said Budairy, Jakarta, September 30, 1991.
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complicity in the coup, and was asked to help defeat the 30 September Movement. 
Umar provided handguns to Subchan for personal protection in case of a PKI attack.24 
(Other NU leaders would later get guns and money from various army officers to 
facilitate the mobilizing of NU members.) Further meetings with army officers over the 
next few days gave impetus to NU's anti-PKI campaign. At a meeting with Subchan 
and other party leaders at the KOTI headquarters on October 2, Sutjipto gave details of 
the involvement of sections of the PKI leadership, as well as its youth and women's 
wings, in the coup movement and called on those in attendance to organize civilian 
support for the army. Later that day, Subchan and a number of Catholic student-group 
leaders, with the tacit backing of army headquarters, formed KAP-Gestapu (Kesatuan 
Aksi Pengganyangan Gestapu; Action Front to Crush the 30 September Movement).25 
This was the first "action front" to oppose the PKI, and it played a pivotal role over the 
following months in mobilizing anti-communist student and youth groups. Subchan 
became its chairman, and Yusuf Hasyim joined the presidium.
On October 3, Munasir met General Nasution, who was recovering in the hospital 
after being injured in the coup attempt, and gained his approval for the launch of a 
forceful NU response against the PKI. Other NU leaders attended a further KOTI 
briefing at which a tape recording was played of confessions made by several 
participants in the coup. It directly implicated the PKI in the 30 September 
Movement.26 By this stage, the army was aware from events in Jakarta and Central Java 
that sections of the military were also implicated in the 30 September Movement. 
Although a small number of PKI members or supporters were also NU members,27 
anti-communist officers encouraged an alliance with the NU because they felt the NU 
was less at risk of PKI infiltration than its own troops.
NU leaders, and especially the militant-dominated group at Matraman, saw these 
meetings as clearing the way for the PKI's destruction. They believed there was now 
"sufficient" evidence of PKI participation in the coup to justify extreme counter­
measures,28 and the army command was urging civilian action. They responded by 
forming the Badan Koordinasi Keamanan Jamiah Nahdlatul Ulama (BKKJNU; NU 
Organization Security Coordinating Body) on October 3, under the chairmanship of
24 Interviews with Eki Syachruddin, Jakarta, March 13,1992, and June 18,1996; and with Harry Tjan 
Silalahi, Jakarta, May 12,1992. Also: Subchan, interviewed by Harold Crouch, Jakarta, April 16,1970. See 
also A. H. Nasution, Memenuhi Panggilan Tugas, vol. 6 (Jakarta: CV Haji Mas Agung, 1988), p. 273; and 
Sundhaussen, Road to Power: Indonesian Military Politics, 1945-1967 (Kuala Lumpur and New York, NY: 
Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 210-11.
25 Interviews with Harry Tjan Silalahi, Jakarta, May 12,1992; Eki Syachruddin, Jakarta, March 13,1992; and 
Subchan, interviewed by Harold Crouch, Jakarta, April 16,1970. Also Sundhaussen, Road to Power, p. 211; 
and Harold Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), p. 141.
26 Interviews with Achmad Sjaichu, Depok, August 26,1991; and Said Budairy, Jakarta, August 30,1991.
27 For more on this, see these autobiographies: Hasan Raid, Pergulatan Muslim Komunis: Otobiografi Hasan 
Raid (Yogyakarta: LKPSM and Syarikat, 2001); and Achmadi Moestahal, Dari Gontor ke Pulau Burn: Memoar 
H. Achmadi Moestahal (Yogyakarta: Syarikat, 2002).
28 The "evidence," in fact, only implicated small sections of the PKI leadership and a number of affiliates, 
such as Pemuda Rakyat and Gerwani; there was little to suggest that other sections of the party had 
foreknowledge of or involvement in the coup. For more on this, see John Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder 
(Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006). For NU's purposes, however, this was enough to 
justify a pogrom against the PKI.
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Munasir.29 Its main purpose was to plan and coordinate NU's campaign against the 
PKI. The prospect of violence, and PBNU's desire to control this, was apparent in 
instructions to Ansor branches on October 3. Those instructions warned:
For further steps in eliminating [menumpas] "30 SEPTEMBER MOVEMENT" and 
its henchmen ... wait for and only implement instructions from the Leaders of 
"NU Community Coordination" [i.e., BKKJNU] which has been formed by PBNU 
[the NU Central Board].30
Although the BKKJNU statement was made in the name of PBNU, it was largely 
the initiative of militants, who seem not to have consulted with either Idham Chalid or 
Wahab Chasbullah. Idham had gone into hiding when the coup was staged, and his 
whereabouts remained unknown to Matraman for almost a week, and Wahab was in 
Jombang and difficult to contact. But even if Idham and Wahab had been present, they 
would have been powerless to halt the militants. Many members of PBNU, who had 
previously been reluctant to move against the PKI, were now fully supportive of 
emphatic action. Moreover, the militants were determined to seize the moment and, as 
Yusuf Hasyim admitted, "cajoling and deceit" were necessary to get things done. More 
than a few official PBNU statements from this period contained forged signatures of 
Idham and other PBNU leaders.31
The next day, the militants took an even bolder step: they decided that NU would 
publicly link the PKI to the 30 September Movement and call for the party to be 
banned. Neither the army nor any party had openly implicated the PKI in the coup. 
The NU militants drafted a resolution calling upon President Sukarno:
To dissolve [membubarkan] as soon as possible the Indonesian Communist Party, 
Pemuda Rakyat, Gerwani, the Public Works' Laborers' Union/SOBSI, as well as 
all other social organizations which participated in masterminding [mendalangi\ 
and/or working together with those who have named themselves the "30 
September Movement."32
On the evening of October 5, Subchan led an NU delegation to the army's media- 
operations center and asked that the resolution be broadcast on Radio Republic 
Indonesia. After gaining Suharto's approval, the army allowed the resolution to be 
broadcast nationally.33 It was also carried in many of the newspapers that were 
published the next morning. The militants were jubilant that NU had become the PKI's 
first public accuser.
29 PBNU, "Surat Keputusan," 3302/Tanf/B/X-'65, October 3,1965, AN 182. Idham Chalid was BKKJNU's 
nominal leader, but effective authority was exercised by Munasir and the three "affairs coordinators" 
(koordinator urusan), Dachlan, Subchan, and Sjaichu.
30 PP GP Ansor, "Instruksi" (Instructions), lst/02/P P /1965 , October 3,1965, AN 172.
31 Interviews with Yusuf Hasyim, Jombang, October 26,1992; and Hamid Baidowi, Jakarta, August 5,1991.
32 PBNU, "Pernjataan Pengurus Besar Partai 'Nahdlatul Ulama' Beserta Segenap Ormas-Ormasnja" 
(Statement of the Nahdlatul Ulama Party Executive Board as well as All its Social Organizations], October 
5,1965, Pamphlet Collection, Monash ASRL.
33 Interviews with Chalid Mawardi, Jakarta, August 14,1991; Munasir, Mojokerto, October 14,1991; Said 
Budairy, Jakarta, August 30,1991; Jusuf Hasyim, Jombang, October 26,1991; and Hamid Baidlowi, Jakarta, 
April 26,1992.
46 Greg Fealy and Katharine McGregor
Following the release of the resolution, BKKJNU sent couriers to NU branches to 
give oral briefings on coup-related events, including "evidence" of PKI complicity and 
the army's tacit endorsement of anti-PKI actions. Branch leaders were urged to prepare 
for mobilizing their members against the Communist Party, but were also warned to 
cooperate closely with reliable non-communist officers and other PKI opponents.34 
PBNU's major concern was that local members would act precipitately, thereby 
inviting retaliation from the army, police, or communists.35
There can be little doubt that party leaders were preparing NU members for mass 
violence against the PKI. PBNU leaders were aware of members' intense hatred of 
communists, which had built up at branch levels inside their organization, and knew 
that little encouragement was needed to unleash a santri offensive. Written instructions 
to branches, although avoiding explicit mention of violent acts such as killing 
(;pembunuhan) or slaughter (pembantaian), made frequent reference to menumpas (to 
eradicate, destroy, annihilate), membersihkan (to clean up), menghabiskan (finish off), 
mengganyang (to crush, smash, gobble), and mengikis habis (eliminate). While it can be 
argued that such terms referred only to the political or ideological destruction of the 
PKI, for the fervently anti-communist members of NU they were an exhortation to 
eliminate physically all traces of communism. Evidence of NU's direct endorsement of 
the violence can be found in some NU communiques, such as correspondence from 
PBNU to the Pekalongan branch of Ansor, thanking the branch for their report on 
efforts to crush the 30 September Movement.36 NU leaders also urged that if any NU 
men became victims of abduction or were "killed in the battle," a report should be filed 
with their name, address, position in the organization, family details, and an 
explanation of how they died, such that appropriate merit would be bestowed upon 
each victim as a syahid (Islamic martyr).37 There are few sources on the number of 
Banser members who died in the violence of 1965-66, perhaps because the total 
number is small.38
PBNU also drew parallels between the Madiun Incident of 1948 and the 30 
September affair. In a circular to all branches on October 9, it described the Communist 
Party in these damning terms:
34 Confidential interviews conducted by Greg Fealy during late 1991 and early 1992 in Gresik, Surabaya, 
Kediri, and Jakarta.
35 The perils of premature action were apparent on October 13 when five Ansor members were shot dead 
by policemen in Bangil, East Java, during a violent demonstration. Crouch, "The Indonesian Army in 
Politics: 1960-1971" (PhD dissertation, Monash University, 1975), p. 263.
36 Ansor Tjabang Kopra Pekalongan, Putjuk pimpinan gerakan Ansor, surat kepada pimpinan gerakan 
pemuda, NU Archives, Arsip Nasional, File No. 117, December 1,1965.
37 Ibid.
38 Sunyoto claims that 155 Banser members died in Banyuwangi between October 17-22,1965, after being 
deceived by members of the PKI. He also claims two santri, one of whom was a Banser member, were 
killed on October 13,1965, by PKI (in the Kediri area). See Agus Sunyoto, Banser Berjihad Menumpas PKI 
(Tulungagung: Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan, PW.GP. Ansor Jawa Timur & Pesulukan Thoriqoh 
Agung, 1996), pp. 113,119-24,136. In his history of Ansor, Choirul Anam also records the numbers of 
Ansor men who had fallen as they were reported at an Ansor meeting in Jember in February 1969. He lists 
six deaths in Malang, seven in Probolinggo, five in Lumajang, seventy-two in Blambangan (453 injured), 
eleven in Tuban, and twenty-two in Surabaya. See Choirul Anam, Gerak Langkah Pemuda Ansor: Sebuah 
Percikan Sejarah Kelahiran (Surabaya: Majalah Nahdlatul Ulama AULA, 1990), p. 93. These numbers are all 
very small compared to the number of PKI and PKI-affiliated persons who died.
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The reckless adventure [petualangan] of the counter-revolutionary "30 September 
Movement," which was master-minded by the communists ... reminds us of the 
reckless adventure which they undertook on 18 September 1948 in Madiun, and 
once again proves the brutality [kekedjaman] and barbaric nature [kebiadaban] of 
atheists whenever they carry out their terror.39
The language of this 1965 circular could only have reinforced impressions among 
the party's grassroots members of the grave threat posed by communism and of the 
need for emphatic action to prevent santri from again becoming the victims of PKI 
aggression.
In party meetings and in discussions with army officers immediately after October 
1, militants began planning for wholesale violence against PKI members.40 The 
hardening of attitudes was apparent on October 8 when Ansor activists, with 
assurances of immunity from army intervention, attacked the PKI headquarters in 
central Jakarta. Shortly afterwards, the buildings of other communist organizations 
and institutions were attacked, as were the houses of PKI leaders. 41 NU's 
accommodationists, led by Idham and Wahab, allowed the violence to escalate. While 
they had been willing to cooperate with the PKI as part of their involvement in 
Sukarno's Guided Democracy regime, they distrusted the communists and were not 
opposed in principle to the PKI being routed or banned. But, pragmatic as always, the 
accommodationists worried about how NU might fare in any change of the political 
constellation, particularly if the destruction of the PKI weakened Sukarno's position. 
Their main concern was securing NU's continued presence in the government.
The Outbreak of Violence
Most of the violence against the PKI and members of affiliated organizations 
occurred in rural areas and regional cities of Indonesia. NU leaders at both the national 
and local levels endorsed the use of violence, sometimes openly, but more often, 
tacitly. Many NU branches also sent expressions of support to PBNU in Jakarta, 
particularly after the October 5 broadcast condemning the PKI.42 Detailed preparations 
for killing communists were usually carried out at the local level, and were overseen 
by NU leaders and ulama from the area.
39 PBNU, "Instruksi," October 9,1965, AN 172.
40 Confidential interviews.
41 Kompas, October 9,1965; Crouch, Army and Politics, p. 141; A. H. Nasution, Memenuhi, p. 277; and 
confidential interviews.
42 Pengurus Tjabang Partai Nahdlatul Ulama, Kabupaten Labuhanbatu, Arsip Nasional NU File No. 115; 
Gerakan Pemuda Ansor Tjabang Kora Tandjungkarang, Arsip Nasional NU File No. 182; Pengurus 
Tjabang Partai Nahdlatul Ulama Pendope Talang Ubi, Arsip Nasional NU File No. 110; Pengurus 
Nahdlatul Ulama, Tjabang Komering Ulu di Belitang (Sumatera Selatan), Arsip Nasional NU File No. 115; 
Pengurus Wilayah Partai Nahdlatul SUMBAR, Arsip Nasional NU File No. 182; Pimpinan Sjurijah Partai 
N.U Tjabang Surabaya, Arsip Nasional NU File No. 182; Pernyataan Bersama Partai Nahdlatul Ulama, 
Tjabang Bangil Dengan Seluruh Ormasnya, NU File No. 182; Pengurus Wilayah Partai Nahdlatul Ulama 
Kalimantan Barat, Arsip Nasional NU File No. 116; Pengurus Wilayah Partai Nahdlatul Maluku, Arsip 
Nasional NU File No. 117; and Badan Kordinasi Keamanan Djamah Nahdlatul Ulama, Dati Lampung, 
Arsip Nasional NU File No. 115.
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Large-scale violence involving NU members began in mid-October. At a meeting of 
East Java Ansor leaders on or about October 10, plans were drawn up, with the army's 
approval, for a series of mass rallies on October 13 in cities across the province. These 
were to be followed by attacks on PKI buildings and the killing of party supporters.43 
The best-documented instance of events surrounding these rallies occurred in Kediri. 
After a large rally of anti-communist organizations, a section of the crowd, including 
local Banser units, descended on the PKI office and killed eleven party members as 
they tried to defend the building. The roundup of PKI members and suspected 
sympathizers began soon afterwards.44
Similar events were occurring in other parts of the province. For example, there 
were violent clashes between NU and PKI groups in the Banyuwangi region on 
October 18, the same day that a mass grave containing the bodies of thirty-five PKI 
supporters was discovered. Several thousand PKI members (and suspected 
sympathizers) lost their lives over the next few days.45 In Central Java, extensive 
attacks on PKI members began around October 18. By the end of that month, youth 
groups, including many Ansor members, were conducting systematic mass killings of 
communists and suspected sympathizers.46
Massacres raged over the next three months. Accurate estimates of the overall 
death toll are impossible, but many scholars say a nationwide figure of between 
250,000 and 500,000 is reasonable.47 A majority of those victims probably perished at 
the hands of Ansor members. In East Java, the site of the heaviest killings, NU youths 
formed the largest group in the death squads. In Central Java, nationalist groups as 
well as modernist Muslims played a major role, though in traditionalist areas Ansor 
members usually predominated.
The dynamics of this communal violence were highly complex and varied 
markedly from region to region.48 A detailed analysis of these events is outside the 
scope of this article, but a number of patterns and generalizations regarding NU's role 
are possible. Violence tended to be worst in areas where the PKI's unilateral actions 
had been most intense. These included districts such as Kediri, Banyuwangi, Ponorogo, 
Klaten, Boyolali, Magelang, Jember, Blitar, and Sidoarjo. In some districts, NU 
members were involved in all aspects of the PKI's elimination. Together with army 
officers and other non-communist groups, they compiled lists of local PKI members,
43 Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, p. 147; and notes from a confidential interview with an Ansor 
leader conducted by Harold Crouch, October 1970. See also Sundhaussen, Road to Power, p. 216.
44 See: Kenneth Young, "Local and National Influences in the Violence of 1965," in The Indonesian Killings of 
1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali, ed. Robert Cribb, p. 80; Crouch, The Army and Politics in Indonesia, p. 
147; and confidential interview with a Kediri Ansor leader.
45 Centre for Village Studies, Gadjah Mada University, "Rural Violence in Klaten and Banyuwangi," in The 
Indonesian Killings of 1965-1966: Studies from Java and Bali, ed. Robert Cribb, p. 80; and Crouch, The Army 
and Politics in Indonesia, p. 147.
46 See Harold Crouch, "The Indonesian Army in Politics: 1960-1971" (PhD dissertation, Monash 
University, 1975), pp. 268-69; and Sundhaussen, Road to Power, pp. 215-16.
47 For a discussion of the extent of the killings and a list of the estimated death tolls, see Cribb, ed., The 
Indonesian Killings 1965-66, p. 12.
48 For some regional studies, see Sulistyo and Sudjatmiko. See also: Hermawan Sulistyo, The Forgotten 
Years: The Missing History of Indonesia's Mass Slaughters, Jombang-Kediri 1965-1966; and Iwan Gardono 
Sudjatmiko, "The Destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party: A Comparative Analysis of East Java 
and Bali," Ann Arbor (Michigan) Microfilms International, 1992.
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participated in apprehending PKI members, sat on the "tribunals" (which decided 
whether the captives were to be executed), and performed the killings. In other 
districts, the military carried out the roundup and "trials" itself, leaving NU and other 
civilian groups to conduct the executions. The killings in these areas would usually be 
supervised by the army, which frequently also provided transport and weapons. This 
was particularly the case in Central Java, where a shortage of reliable non-communist 
units obliged the RPKAD (Resimen Parakomando Angkatan Darat, Army Para- 
Commando Regiment) commander, Colonel Sarwo Edhie, to train civilian groups, 
including Ansor, to undertake the mass executions.49
The extent of the massacres perpetrated by NU reflects a number of factors. Most 
important was the prevalence of a virtual war psychology in which santri believed they 
had but two options: kill or be killed. The phrase "kill or be killed" (membunuh atau 
dibunuh) was the comment most frequently heard during interviews with NU members 
involved in the killings. One interviewee said, with some emotion, that "If I didn't get 
rid of [menghabisi] them [the PKI], then I'm convinced they would have gotten rid of 
me, and perhaps my family and kiai as well. That's what happened at Madiun."50 For 
many Muslims, the lesson of Madiun was that the Muslim community would never be 
safe until communism was annihilated. NU militants promoted the idea that Muslims 
must use the opportunity to strike first and that any hesitation or weakness would 
allow the advantage to shift to the communists. It made little difference that the PKI, 
within weeks of the coup, had been ravaged, because many NU members were 
convinced of communism's inherent regenerative power. NU's years of vilifying and 
dehumanizing the PKI made the task easier. Army-inspired accounts of mutilation of 
the murdered generals also confirmed fears about the wickedness of communists. In 
addition, there was constant, mostly exaggerated reporting of PKI sabotage and the 
discovery of PKI hideouts and weapons caches, all of which fed into this belief in an 
active opposition.
The killings were performed in a grimly methodical and orderly manner, usually 
by cutting victims' throats with knives, kris, or sharp agricultural implements, such as 
sickles and machetes. Groups of up to several hundred condemned men could be 
dispatched to a given site each evening. Ansor execution squads usually waited for the 
approval of senior local NU leaders and the army before proceeding with each new 
round of killings.51
By early December 1965, the army, fearing that the killings were spiraling out of 
control, began measures to bring a halt to the violence. Military commanders in Central 
and East Java began warning Muslim leaders that further bloodshed would not be 
tolerated. Initially they threatened to arrest and charge with murder those
49 Crouch, "The Indonesian Army," pp. 268-69; and Sundhaussen, Road to Power, pp. 215-16. Sundhaussen 
suggests that the army sought to restrain the Muslim killings in East Java but lacked the ground forces to 
achieve this. Almost all of our interviewees, however, stressed that most of the massacres, especially 
during the most intensive phase in late October and early November, only proceeded after being cleared 
by local army leaders.
50 Confidential interview, Gresik, October 19,1991.
51 Confidential interviews; Young, "Local and National Influences in the Violence of 1965," pp. 79-85; 
Crouch, "The Indonesia Army," p. 270; and Pipit Rochijat, "Am I PKI or non-PKI," Indonesia 40 (October 
1985): 37-52.
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participating in death squads. By January, however, the continuing slaughter forced 
military officers to declare that offenders would be shot on sight.52
PBNU also tried to reduce anti-communist actions. In early January, it instructed 
branches to "assist all Government Officials in their efforts to create a calm 
environment within the community in order to hasten a political settlement." It 
claimed the PKI, "after failing in the coup d'etat, was now trying to lure its enemies 
into illegal and criminal actions."53
Most of the anti-communist violence had been halted by February.54 Members of 
the NU did, however, participate in the final military-led campaign against surviving 
members of the PKI in South Blitar in 1968.55
The Lasting Effects of the Violence and Changing Views of this Past within NU
The violence of this period had enduring effects on relations between NU members 
and the communities targeted. Some survivors of the violence who were nominal 
Muslims converted from Islam to Christianity.56 Many turned to Christianity because 
they felt more accepted within these circles or were grateful for the welfare activities 
undertaken by Christian groups. Ngatiyah, for example, who is the former secretary 
for Gerwani's Karang branch in Solo, recalled that, while she was in the Plantungan 
women's prison, a Catholic priest visited her every day. She recalled how many people 
told her that Gerwani and PKI people were "satans," and that they would not go to 
heaven. When she was released, she became a Catholic.57 In a detailed study of the 
impact of the violence of 1965-66 on the village of Ngampel, Central Java, in a 
plantation area near Salatiga, Singgih Nugroho documents a mass baptism of local 
people in 1966.58They chose to become Christian because of the support of a local 
Christian village official and because they felt at risk in the anti-PKI purges if they did 
not have a religion. For some survivors, the activities of Ansor, in particular, instilled 
in them a fear of Islam and Islamic organizations.
The violence of 1965-66 also ushered in a new regime that frequently used military 
repression as a response to dissent. Anti-communism became a cornerstone of the 
Suharto regime and, for this reason, NU members continued to characterize their role 
in the killings as a form a patriotic service to the nation. NU also eulogized its role in 
the 1965 killings as a means of reminding the regime of a debt owed to this 
community. This was particularly the case after NU was increasingly marginalized by 
the regime beginning in the late 1960s. For example, many NU-affiliated organizations 
(such as its trade union, farmers' association, and cultural institute) were either closed
52 Crouch, Army and Politics, pp. 153-54.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 See, in this issue of Indonesia, Vannessa Hearman, "Guerrillas, Guns, and Knives? Debating Insurgency in 
South Blitar, East Java, 1967-68."
56 Alan Thomson, "The Churches of Java in the Aftermath of the Thirtieth of September Movement," South 
East Asia Journal of Theology 9 (1968): 7-20.
57 "Ngatiyah (Mantan Sekretaris Gerwani) Saya Muslimah yang Taat," RUAS, Edition 23 (2007): 4—5.
58 Singgih Nugroho, Menyintas dan Menyeberanv: Perpindahan Massal Keagamaan Pasca 1965 di Pedesaan Jawa 
(Yogyakarta: Syarikat, 2002).
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down or absorbed into regime-sponsored bodies, NU's party was subject to increasing 
political restriction and intimidation by the New Order, and NU lost its last cabinet 
minister in 1971. NU's irritation at being sidelined was evidenced in a 1971 NU 
publication, which noted the organization's support for banning the PKI and also 
detailed the deaths of several NU "martyrs" at the hands of the PKI in Banyuwangi in 
October 1965.59 Thus, in the first decade of the Suharto presidency, NU members felt a 
sense of betrayal and frustration.
Following NU's formal withdrawal from politics in 1984, relations improved 
between NU and the New Order regime. In this context, NU continued to celebrate its 
past service to the nation. In a 1990 commemorative history of Ansor, for example, 
Choirul Anam, a former Ansor member, lauds its role in crushing the communists. He 
celebrates the jasa (service) of Ansor and refers to it as "the backbone of the East Java 
operations." Replicating ideas current at the time of the killings, Anam also frames the 
participation of Ansor in religious terms, stating that "the communists were enemies of 
religion, they had to be wiped out [diberantas]."60 Yet this claim concerning the extent to 
which PKI followers were the enemy of religion or opposed religious belief has been 
exaggerated over time by those within NU who defend NU's role in the violence. 
Budiawan stresses that in PKI rhetoric, the PKI never attacked religious institutions, 
but instead emphasized the categories of "revolutionary" or "non-revolutionary" and 
promoted the idea that religion should be a personal choice.61 Even when tensions 
between the party and the NU heightened from 1963, as the PKI began implementing 
the land-reform campaign, the PKI did not attack Islam per se, but instead targeted 
particular religious leaders on the basis of their class and land holdings.62 Writing 
about the tensions created by land reform, Margo Lyons observes that religious leaders 
resorted to religious symbols and justifications for opposing the communists, because 
they were unable to respond adequately to the class-based claims of the communists.63 
Hence, although the conflict of the early 1960s is generally remembered as one about 
religion, more often this conflict was fueled by concerns over economic resources and 
political influence.
By the mid 1990s, NU was more cautious than it had been during earlier periods of 
the New Order about the way it represented the violence of 1965-66. In the 1996
59 Lembaga Pendidikan Maaruf NU, Menangkan Pembangunan Menangkan Keadilan dan Kebenaran (Jakarta: 
n.p., 1971). The Banyuwangi incident of October 18,1965, in which Ansor members were killed in an 
ambush by the PKI, is documented in "Rural Violence in Klaten and Bayunwangi," a report prepared by 
the Centre for Village Studies at Gadjah Mada University in 1982 and published in a translated form in 
Cribb, The Indonesian Killings 1965-66, pp. 154—57. There is also a monument, called the Monumen 
Pancasila Jaya (Victorious Pancasila Monument) to the Ansor men who died in the village of Cemetuk, in 
Bayuwangi. The monument is so named to imply the patriotism of those who died. See "Puluhan Pemuda 
Ansor dibantai secara licik," Duta Masyarakat, October 3, 2001. This newspaper article claims sixty-two 
Ansor members died in Cemetuk.
60 Choirul Anam, Gerak Langkah Pemuda Ansor: Sebualt Percikan Sejarah Kelahiran (Surabaya: Majalah 
Nahdlatul Ulama AULA, 1990), p. 92.
61 Budiawan, Mematahkan Pewarisan Ingatan, p. 111.
62 Such leaders were often referred to by the very derogatory label setan desa, or villages satans. Budiawan, 
pp. 123-24.
63 Margo L. Lyon, "Bases of Conflict in Rural Java" (monograph, University of California-Berkeley, Center 
for South and Southeast Asia Studies, 1976), pp. 62-64.
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publication "Banser Undertakes Jihad to Crush the PKI,"64 Agus Sunyoto, an historian 
and former head of Ansor in East Java, tried to clarify Banser's role in crushing the 
communists. He details close cooperation between the RPKAD instructors and Banser 
in Banyuwangi65 and suggests that sub-regional military (korem) commanders viewed 
Banser as part of a wider people's defense organization and assisted in training them 
as militia.66 He notes there was also close cooperation between the district-level 
military commands and Banser—in particular, that those detained were given over to 
the district's military, but that, in return, those army commands sent PKI prisoners to 
Banser to be executed.67 Sunyoto thus emphasizes the joint participation of Banser and 
the military in the killings. Choirul Anam acknowledges in the preface to his book that 
he wrote the work partly because of military objections to accusations from the PRD 
(Partai Rakyat Demokratik, People's Democratic Party)68 that only the army was 
responsible for the 1965-66 killings.69 These objections arose in the context of growing 
pressure on the Indonesian military due to its increasing isolation from President 
Suharto and a string of violent repressions that it had carried out, including its role in 
the 1991 Dili massacre, its participation in the 1996 crackdown on Megawati's 
alternative PDI party, the PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia-Perjuangan, Indonesian 
Democratic Party of Struggle), and its repression of the PRD. Anam confirmed that the 
role of Banser was considerable, but he stated that this book would, indeed, prove that 
this role was not independent of the ABRI command structure.
With the end of the New Order regime in May 1998, new possibilities arose for 
actively addressing the violence of 1965-66. Following the demise of press censorship, 
the media increasingly began to canvass the events of the 1965 coup attempt and the 
killings. Former political prisoners from 1965 also began to form research and 
advocacy organizations, which were either specific to the violence of 1965-66, such as 
YPKP 1965/1966 (Yayasan Penelitian Korban Pembunuhan 1965/1966, The 
Foundation for the Research into Victims of the 1965-66 Killings), or connected with 
broader groups of people who also considered themselves victims of the New Order 
regime, such as Pakorba (Paguyuban Korban Orde Baru, Association of Victims of the 
New Order Regime). They began to document and write about cases of human-rights 
abuses in 1965-66, as well as about the subsequent political imprisonment of former or 
alleged PKI members. In this context, views within NU about the organization's roles 
in the 1965-66 killings became multifaceted and were carefully framed in anticipation 
of possible investigations into human-rights abuses.
As noted above, President Abdurrahman Wahid's personal apology in 2000 to 
those affected by the violence and his proposal to lift the longstanding ban on 
communism triggered greater public discussion about NU's role in the violence of
64 Choirul Anam, foreword in Agus Sunyoto et al., Banser Berjihad Menumpas PKI.
65 Ibid., p. 124.
66 Ibid., p. 157.
67 Ibid., p. 158.
68 The PRD was a radical organization made up of student activists who, from the 1980s onwards, began to 
defend farmers in land-dispute cases against the Suharto regime's development plans. They also 
mobilized thousands of people in labor protests. The Suharto regime branded the PRD as the new PKI and 
banned the party in 1997 and imprisoned many of its leaders.
69 Anam in Sunyoto, Banser Berjihad Menumpas PKI, p. ii.
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1965-66, thus broaching possible reconciliation regarding this past. Despite 
Abdurrahman's willingness to apologize for the role of NU, some senior and 
influential members of NU, such as Yusuf Hasyim, Abdurrahman's uncle, went to 
great lengths to oppose any efforts by survivor organizations to rehabilitate their 
names, have their civil rights restored, revise the way the PKI is represented in school 
history texts, and create a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to examine, inter alia, 
the killings of 1965-66. Commencing in 2000, Yusuf launched a campaign against 
making concessions to communists, arguing that Indonesia faced the threat of a PKI 
comeback. He wrote a letter to the Islamic newspaper Republika soon after 
Abdurrahman proposed lifting the ban on communism, explaining why NU rejects 
communism.70 In 2001, Yusuf organized a photographic exhibition in Jakarta detailing 
the "cruelty of communists" in 1948 and 1965, and cataloging communist perfidy in 
other countries. The exhibition was repeated in 2003.'1 Then, in 2004, he hosted a 
national dialogue between NU ulama and those who identified themselves as relatives 
of victims of the communists in both Madiun in 1948 and in 1965.'2 These events were 
intended to stem any sympathy felt towards victims of the post-coup violence and 
prevent concessions being granted to them.
Yusuf Hasyim also led a delegation to meet with the speaker of the People's 
Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR) to protest the 
omission of the 1948 and 1965 "PKI revolts" from the 2004 history curriculum.73 By 
December 2005, the National Curriculum Standardization Board decided to return to 
the 1994 curriculum and include accounts of the Madiun Affair as a PKI betrayal and 
of the centrality of PKI's involvement in the 1965 coup attempt.74 In addition, he 
headed an NU delegation to parliament that rejected the proposed Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission. Yusuf worked with two Surabaya-based men, Aminuddin 
Kasdi and Arukat Djaswadi, on both these campaigns. Aminuddin Kasdi, who has 
written two anti-communist books,75 is an ex-Ansor member, while Arukat Djaswadi is 
a former member of Pll (Pelajar Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Students' 
Association), an organization involved in destroying the PKI.76Following Yusuf's 
death in 2006, Aminuddin and Arukat continued their work, with military assistance 
and encouragement,77by organizing street demonstrations and lobbying parliament 
against any kind of concession to victims.
711 Yusuf Hasyim, "Kenapa kita menentang komunisme?," Republika, April 29, 2000.
71 Yusuf Hasyim, "Komunis dan Sejarah Hitam Bangsa," Republika, August 7, 2003.
77 The dialogue was called Dialog lllaimi Nil Dengan Keluarga Korban PKI '48 diMadiun and '65 di Jakarta, 
hereafter "Dialog Ulama Nll," and held on March 12, 2004, in Jakarta.
77 "Pelajaran Sejarah KembaIi ke Kurikulum," Republika, June 24, 2005.
74 Oktamandjaya and M. Reza, "Gerakan 30 September Kembali Masuk Kurikulum Sejarah," Tempo 
Interaktif, December 1, 2005, and tempointeraktif.com, accessed March 15, 2007.
75 See Aminuddin Kasdi, Kaum Alerah Alenjarah (Jakarta, Yogyakarta: Jendela, 2001); and, more recently, 
G30S PKI/1965 Bedah Ceasar IDezvan Revolusioner Indonesia (Jakarta: Java Pustaka Media Utama, 2005).
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When he commented on the violence of 1965-66, Yusuf wavered between 
emphasizing the role of the army in inciting the violence and reasserting the 
independent role of NU. In a short account of the violence published in 2005, he notes 
that the local military headquarters (Koramil) in East and Central Java supplied NU 
with lists of Islamic figures whom the PKI had intended to target as a way of stirring 
up hatred.78 He questions whether those lists originated from the PKI or from the 
military.
Hasyim Muzadi, the current general chairman of NU, was similarly opposed to 
Abdurrahman's proposed apology. Hasyim was born in Tuban, East Java, in 1949, and 
was sixteen years old at the time of the coup attempt. He declined to talk at length 
about the violence of 1965, suggesting rather defensively that "all that happened must 
be considered history and not opened up again, otherwise another civil war might 
occur."79 Contrary to our earlier accounts about communists' reluctance to use religion 
as the reason for attacking their opponents, Hasyim claimed the PKI considered 
Islamic people the enemy and that "the party had intended to carry out a genocide." 
The choice of this term, "genocide," is telling given that the anti-communist killings 
were, indeed, comparable to the mass-scale violence associated with genocide. It is as if 
Hasyim is claiming victimhood for Muslims alone on the grounds that they were 
under threat of annihilation. Hasyim's claim mirrors those of the fervently anti­
communist poet Taufik Ismail, who has written anti-communist tracts detailing 
killings perpetrated by communists around the world.80 Both these claims build on the 
recurring rationalization that in 1965 it was a case of "kill or be killed." While this was 
clearly a widely held view in NU circles at the time of the killings, in retrospect it does 
not seem to be based on reality. There were few signs of PKI preparation for large-scale 
violence and little resistance from PKI members to the anti-communist pogrom. 
Contradicting earlier histories of NU, Hasyim also carefully stated that the military 
was the most influential force in the killings, particularly because of the role they 
played in supplying lists of PKI members.81 He said he would reject any effort to allow 
communism to become a legal movement again because "it would threaten religion." 
In an internal NU 2004 dialogue concerning "victims of the PKI" from Madiun and 
1965, Hasyim expressed concerns about organizations "right down to the village level" 
agitating to investigate the past, arguing that this would only reopen old wounds.82 His 
reference, presumably, was to victims' groups such as YPKP 1965/1966, yet he referred 
to the rehabilitation of "the extreme left wing" during the reform era. Hasyim has thus 
expressed fears that former political prisoners might gain too much influence. His 
comments also reveal concerns about members of NU being prosecuted for their roles 
in 1965.
Muchith Muzadi, Hasyim's older brother, who is a highly respected NU elder, was 
also very guarded in discussing the 1965-66 killings.83 Muchith was the secretary of the
78 Yusuf Hasyim, "Killing Communists," pp. 16-17.
79 Interview with Hasyim Muzadi, PBNU, Jakarta, May 19, 2007.
80 Taufiq Ismail, Katastrofi Mendunia: Marxisma, Leninisma, Stalinisma, Maoisme, Narkoba (Jakarta: Yayasan 
Titik Infinitum, 2004).
81 Interview with Hasyim Muzadi, PBNU, Jakarta, May 19, 2007.
82 Hasyim Muzadi, Dialog Ulama NU.
83 Interview with Kiai Muchith Muzadi, March 2, 2008, Jember.
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Malang branch of Ansor from 1963-66 and secretary of the Jember branch of Ansor 
from 1966-68,84 both located in East Java. He acknowledged that there were "excesses" 
in the repression of the PKI, but said that this level of violence was not specific or 
confined to this case. He also speculated that "if the PKI had succeeded with the 30 
September Movement, many Indonesians would have died."85 This idea that the PKI 
would have done far worse if they had taken power was also expressed in the 
comments of Abdullah Faqih, who presides over Langitan pesantren in the small town 
of Tuban, northwest of Surabaya.86 Abdullah was in charge of this pesantren at the time 
of the 1965 coup attempt, and he expressed great relief that the generals were the first 
target of the PKI in 1965 and not the kiai, otherwise, in his view, "there would have 
been another Madiun and perhaps more kiai would have been victims." Madiun is thus 
a key rationalization for why santri had to act to stop the PKI. In our interviews, in both 
the 1990s and since the fall of Suharto, most interviewees portray the PKI as aggressors 
in 1965, focusing on the violence of the coup attempt and referring back to Madiun as 
an example of the threat posed by the PKI.
When Abdullah Faqih spoke of the role of Ansor in suppressing the PKI, there was 
a degree of heroism projected into his account reminiscent of New Order-period 
reports of this violence. He noted, for example, "although all religions were the enemy 
of the PKI, it was only Muslims or the kiai who were brave enough to face the PKI."87 
He also suggested that it was NU men, Ansor members especially, who opposed the 
PKI most persistently.
Lesser-ranking figures within NU, who are not perhaps as wary about guarding 
the image of NU, have spoken far more openly about either their direct roles in the 
violence of 1965-66 or about the role of NU. In 2008, a number of former Banser 
members spoke candidly to the journalist Anthony Deutsch of the Associated Press. 
The Bangil preacher, Sulchan, stated that the order to eliminate all communists came 
through NU Islamic clerics. He recounted explicitly and with no remorse his role in 
killing communists, stating that the killings were justified because the communists 
were the enemies of his religion.88 Mansur, the commander of two hundred Banser 
men in Bangil, also recounted collecting the names of communists, marking their 
houses in red on maps, and rounding up those individuals to be interrogated or 
killed.89
Other members of NU who witnessed the violence have expressed remorse for the 
killings. The senior NU figure, Chalid Mawardi, who was among those who backed 
the repression of the PKI, recalls being shocked by the killings. When he traveled to 
East Java, he saw rivers full of corpses and bodies lying along the roads. In his view, 
people in the villages should not have been killed.90 Some NU kiai, such as the Ikabepi
84 Moch Eksan, Kiai Kelana: Biografi Kiai Muchith Muzadi (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2000), pp. 54-55.
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www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-ll-15-2183917306x.htm, accessed December 10, 2008.
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head, Muslih, argued against the killings when the matter was discussed at senior NU 
levels, and he also gave sanctuary to several PKI members whom he regarded as being 
of "sound character."91
In the mid-1960s, Machrus Ali was head of Lirboyo pesantren in Kediri. Kediri, 
located on the Brantas River, was a site of extensive violence, and Machrus was heavily 
implicated in the killings. His eldest son was more reflective about the killings and 
their effects. Imam Yahya recounted that on several occasions he went along with other 
members of the pesantren and army to capture members of the PKI. He recalled:
Sometimes they would take two people, sometimes five or ten people. Ansor 
would help arrest them and prepare a detention site. Sometimes they were held 
in the empty houses of PKI members who had fled. Then they were handed over 
to the military for "trial." After they were arrested, those who were identified as 
leaders of the PKI by agreement between Ansor and the military and their data 
[supplied by the District Military Command] were killed. Ansor usually killed 
them in the jungle or quiet places.92
Imam admitted to being afraid. He also recalled the fear of many local people, 
especially women and children whose families were PKI. "They suffered a lot and I felt 
pity for them."93 Although he noted that members of Ansor were very willing to take 
part in the violence and that they did not have to be forced, there were many who were 
traumatized by their roles afterwards. They went to the kiais to be healed.94 This point 
is rarely mentioned in accounts of the violence and suggests a more enduring trauma 
within NU than some would admit. Hasyim Asari, an Ansor member who participated 
in killing PKI members in Blitar between 1967-68, for example, claimed there were no 
lasting effects from the violence of this period on the families of those killed, and, in 
fact, many joined NU.95
In contrast to the many older NU members who share cautious views about 
reopening investigations into this past, some young members of Ansor who were 
active in the student-led reform movement of 1997-98 felt compelled to confront the 
stigma associated with Ansor's past. In 1999, NU activists from eighteen towns met to 
discuss the effects of the 1965 tragedy on Ansor and Banser. Initially, they aimed to 
break down the divisions between NU members and survivors of the violence by 
undertaking research into NU members' roles in the killings. Abdurrahman Wahid's 
personal apology to victims of the violence of 1965 provided an important source of 
support for the activists' research. The Yogyakarta branch of Ansor followed 
Abdurrahman's lead and also offered an apology to victims of the 1965 violence.96 In 
response to the enduring stigma associated with Ansor, Yogyakarta pledged to not
91 Interview, Muslih, May 16,1992.
92 Interview, Imam Yahya, February 29, 2008, Kediri.
93 Ibid.
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95 Interview, Hasyim Asari, Blitar, February 10, 2009.
96 Said A. Umar, Pernyataan GP Ansor Yogya ttg Tragedi 65, 2000, available at 
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only investigate Ansor's role in the killings, but also to demilitarize its armed wing, 
which was still strongly associated with military symbols and ideology.97
On December 10, 2000, on International Human Rights Day, NU activists from 
eighteen towns in Java founded the organization Syarikat (Masyarakat Santri untuk 
Advokasi Rakyat, Santri Society for People's Advocacy). They were driven firstly by 
the desire to reform the image of Ansor and NU, yet those who work for Syarikat are 
also motivated by compassion for survivors of the violence. Syarikat has supported 
former political prisoners by creating associations for women victims and by 
undertaking efforts to lobby members of parliament to address this past and, in 
particular, to end discrimination against former political prisoners and their families. 
Syarikat also seeks to promote truth-telling, using its publications, films, and 
photographic and artifact-based exhibitions to raise awareness.98 9Budiawan Purwadi 
stresses the emphasis within Syarikat's work of challenging the image of Muslims and 
communists as eternal enemies: a theme that was often repeated by those whom we 
interviewed. To achieve this, Syarikat has published the memoirs of two Muslim 
communists and also taken up the theme of Muslim-communists in its magazine 
RUAS."
Syarikat seeks to renew and rebuild the bonds between two groups that have been 
deliberately isolated from one another for almost forty years. It has gained support 
from some kiai for its work on humanitarian grounds, and, at the same time, has 
encountered considerable resistance from others, such as Yusuf Hasyim, who warned 
Syarikat not to support proposals for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
Despite extensive interviews with members of NU and survivors of the violence, 
Syarikat has not published a comprehensive report of its research findings on NU's 
role in the violence. On several occasions it has, however, hinted at how it views the 
violence and NU's responsibility for and participation in that violence. The head of the 
Blitar branch of Syarikat reported, for example, that survivors of the violence and older 
members of NU concluded during the first Yogyakarta Ansor "goodwill gathering," 
held in 2002, "that the two sides had been made into enemies for the purposes of those 
in power."100 In 2005, after several years studying NU's role in the violence, a Syarikat 
researcher offered a similar analysis, arguing that the violence of 1965 was vertical and 
not horizontal in origin, and concluding that, therefore, the violence had been state- 
directed.101 This is, of course, a more acceptable narrative for members of NU, but, as 
we argued above, there is evidence of widespread justification at the elite levels of NU 
for the violence against the PKI and members of affiliated organizations. The reason 
Syarikat promotes this version of NU's role is that Syarikat's primary aim is to
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strengthen societal relations.102 We find this goal incompatible with conducting 
objective research into NU's role in perpetrating violence.103
Perhaps the best indication of Ansor's current official position on the violence of 
1965-66 is the version of Banser's role that is posted on the Ansor official website. The 
statement outlines the history of Ansor's role in this violence, noting firstly and 
defensively that many people in society strongly disagreed with the PKI's strategies 
and actions.104 It then claims that many NU members died in the efforts to crush the 
PKI,105 and also notes openly that those deaths should be attributed to the manner in 
which Ansor spearheaded this operation. Added to this commentary is a note from the 
online editor:
the violence carried out by members of Ansor need not be a source of pride for 
the office bearers and members of Ansor, because no matter what, this was a 
form of revenge against the PKI. Instead, a more humanitarian approach shown 
by Gus Dur [a name used for Abdurrahman Wahid] to do with 1965 could be an 
example for the broader membership of NU.106
The editor adds a cautious qualification concerning Gus Dur's apology, noting: 
"Gus Dur's noble attitude does not acknowledge that the PKI was right or reflect a 
validation of the PKI, nor did he intend to blame other groups." Instead, the editor 
insists, the message was that "violence against other members of the nation based on 
political differences should not be repeated nor become a source of pride in the 
memories of members of Ansor."107 This comment was made in the context of attacks 
on Gus Dur by Islamist groups and more conservative NU members over his support 
for the political rehabilitation of former leftists. In addition to his personal apology to 
former leftists, in 2002, for example, Abdurrahman Wahid wrote the foreword for the 
controversial and provocatively titled memoir I am Proud to be the Child of a PKI Member 
(Aku Bangga Jadi Anak PKI), written by PDI-P (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia- 
Perjuangan, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle) parliamentarian Ribka 
Tjiptaning Proeltariyati.108The book prompted noisy anti-communist rallies and much 
criticism of Abdurrahman.109 The editor's note on the Ansor website indicates, 
however, an effort within the younger circles of NU to reconsider the way in which 
this violence is remembered without discrediting Ansor.
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Conclusions
The memories articulated by witnesses and survivors of the 1965-66 killings 
continue to arouse a wide array of responses and emotions within NU, though it is 
possible to group these into three broad categories. The first is one of proud 
acknowledgement of NU's role in the physical elimination of the PKI. This is usually 
accompanied by religious-framed justifications that emphasize the aggressiveness of 
the PKI and an implacable opposition to any easing of restrictions on communism. The 
late Yusuf Hasyim was the best known proponent of this position. The second category 
is one of quiet regret at the extent of the violence, and often involves downplaying 
NU's involvement in the killings, while accepting that emphatic action was justified to 
protect the Muslim community and Indonesia from communist aggression. Hasyim 
Muzadi epitomizes this view. The third is that NU acted excessively, even 
reprehensively, in conducting mass executions of communists and that the 
organization should now confront and admit to its bloody past and set about 
rehabilitating the rights and status of victims of the 1965-66 violence. Abdurrahman 
Wahid is the advocate par excellence of such a stance. By far, the largest and most 
influential groups in NU subscribe to the first two categories, which suggests that there 
is little prospect of fundamental change in the organization's attitudes to the killings 
and of reconciliation with former communists in the medium term. In their efforts to 
defend or downplay the scale of violence, representatives of the two dominant 
positions within NU refuse to view the extra-judicial killings carried out by NU men as 
atrocities or gross abuses of human rights. They prefer to perpetuate the narrative of 
Muslim victimhood at the hands of communists, and refuse to humanize fully the 
hundreds of thousands of people who died
This article has demonstrated the many different rationales, perspectives, and 
interpretations that NU members use to explain the killings. Martin van Bruinessen, in 
analyzing NU politics of the 1980s and early 1990s, wrote of how creative NU kiai and 
activists can be when molding history for a contemporary purpose.110 We have seen 
how members of the NU asserted a right to a bigger role in the Suharto regime in the 
early 1970s by virtue of its participation in the PKI's destruction and how NU members 
largely continued to celebrate their participation in the violence throughout the New 
Order regime as a form of service to the nation. In the post-Suharto period, 
representations of NU's role have become more complex, with some continuing to 
defend the violence, and others—such as the youth-oriented organization Syarikat— 
asserting that both NU and PKI members were victims of army manipulation in the 
1960s and 1970s. Much as professional historians and human-rights campaigners may 
strive rigorously to examine past events, many in NU have little reason to do so, either 
out of fear that communism or communal conflict may reemerge or because it does not 
serve their contemporary interests.
Finally, regardless of how its members "remember" the 1965-66 killings, the 
weight of historical evidence indicates that NU was an active, rather than passive, 
participant in the slaughter of communists, and that, in many areas, ulama and santri
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needed little encouragement to begin violent action. NU's involvement in destroying 
the PKI was planned and overseen by its central leadership, particularly the militant 
faction led by figures such as Subchan, Yusuf Hasyim, and Munasir, but local leaders 
organized grassroots NU groups either to conduct the killings themselves or assist the 
military in doing so. NU elites undoubtedly shaped much of the anti-PKI discourse 
within NU, fomenting among grassroots groups a sense of lethal danger about 
communism. These elites saw the PKI as posing a direct threat to their privileged 
economic, political, and social standing. In presenting this threat to their supporters, 
however, they used religious terms. Thus, it is difficult to sustain the argument that 
NU was manipulated by the military into launching the bloodshed. Both the army 
under Suharto and the NU were determined to use the coup attempt to rid Indonesia 
of communism as a political and social force. NU's killing squads would have 
continued their grisly work well into 1966 had they not been discouraged by the 
organization's leaders, as well as forced to desist by the army. In the immediate 
aftermath of the killings, the dominant sentiment in NU was one of pride and, indeed, 
party leaders used their violent anti-communism as a source of political capital as they 
sought (often in vain) to extract concessions from the regime. However contemporary 
NU leaders choose to portray these events, the historical record is clear.
